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Abstract
People’s desire for fair transactions can play an important role in negotiations, or-
ganizations, and markets. In this paper, we show that markets can also shape what
people consider to be a fair transaction. We propose a simple and generally-applicable
model of path-dependent fairness preferences, in which past experiences shape pref-
erences, and we experimentally test the model’s predictions. We find that previous
exposure to competitive pressure substantially and persistently reduces subjects’ fair-
ness concerns, making them more likely to accept transactions in which they receive a
low share of the surplus. Consistent with our theory, we also find that past experience
has little effect on subjects’ inclinations to treat others unfairly.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that people’s aversion toward unfair transactions can play an
important role in markets and negotiations. In product markets, consumers’ feelings of en-
titlement restrict sellers’ ability to exploit changes in supply and demand (Kahneman et al.,
1986), while in labor markets, reciprocal gift exchange can lead to involuntary unemploy-
ment (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1993).1 To incorporate such non-pecuniary concerns into
economic theory, economists have proposed models of “social preferences,” which assume
that in addition to maximizing consumption, people also care about the fairness or kindness
of own or others’ actions. A common property of these models is that the fairness or kind-
ness of an action or outcome is evaluated by an exogenous and static criterion such as equal
division or surplus maximization, which implies that fairness judgments remain stable over
time and past experiences should not affect the evaluation criterion.2
Casual observation and introspection, however, suggest that this static description of
people’s feelings of entitlement is incomplete. Consider two examples. Americans are getting
increasingly upset about raises in gasoline prices.3 The Swiss have signed petitions to start
referenda over a CHF 40,000 (roughly 41,500 USD) minimum yearly wage and an initiative
that restricts the highest salary in a Swiss company to no more than 12 times the lowest
one.4 It appears that Americans feel entitled to cheap petrol, and the Swiss are accustomed
to high wages. For outsiders, these expressions of anger are hard to comprehend. After all,
European gas prices are twice as high as American prices, and the Swiss workers are already
amongst the most privileged in the world in terms of wages. The anger, therefore, seems to
be best explained by fairness standards that are dynamic and shaped by past experience.
Yet to our knowledge, direct evidence for path-dependent fairness standards is still miss-
ing. In this paper, we provide an experimental test of path-dependent fairness preferences
by exogenously manipulating subjects’ experiences, keeping everything else constant. To de-
1For reviews of this evidence, see Fehr et al. (2009) on labor markets and Camerer (2003) on negotiations.
2See, for example, Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and
Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), or Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Models including
reciprocity motives suggest a certain context dependence since the desire to treat someone kindly depends
on how they acted. But the evaluation of an agent’s kindness still requires a static criterion. Different from
these commonly used models of social preferences, but similar to ours, Benjamin (2005) proposes a model
of reference-dependent fairness preferences in which an employee’s period t wage serves as his period t + 1
reference point, and Kaur (2012) formalizes the idea that workers may retaliate against a firm that offers
them a wage below their reference wage.
3Tom Geoghegan. 2011. “Why are Americans so angry about petrol prices?” BBC News. May 11, 2011,
accessed July 9th, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13338754.
4Tim Judah. 2013. “Angry Swiss aren’t done slimming the fat cats” Bloomberg. March 4, 2013,
accessed July 9th, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-04/angry-swiss-aren-t-done-slimming-
the-fat-cats.html.
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rive our hypotheses, we introduce a model of path-dependent fairness preferences in which
past experience shapes people’s feelings of entitlement. Our investigation is inspired by the
seminal work of Kahneman et al. (1986), who introduce an intuitive notion of fairness in
which “A firm is not allowed to increase its profits by arbitrarily violating the entitlement
of its transactors to the reference price, rent, or wage,” and who argue that past experience
determines this reference transaction: “When there is a history of transactions between firm
and transactor, the most recent price, wage, or rent will be adopted for reference...” and
“terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of a
reference transaction.”5
In the first phase of our experiment, all subjects participate in one of two market games.
In the proposer competition (PC) game (Roth et al., 1991), two proposers make an offer of a
monetary allocation to one responder, who can choose to accept either one or zero of those
offers. In the responder competition (RC) game (Fischbacher et al., 2009), one proposer
makes an offer to two responders, who simultaneously choose whether or not to accept the
offer, with one responder randomly selected to transact in the case that both offers are
accepted. Consistent with previous evidence, market conditions have a large impact on the
offers: in the PC game, competitive pressures force proposers to give up most of their surplus,
while in the RC game, proposers keep most of their surplus.
In the second phase of the experiment, proposers and responders are matched one-on-one
in a variant of the ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al., 1982), and proposers again make offers to
responders. Consistent with previous studies, responders are willing to reject an offer and
forgo significant monetary gains to punish proposers making unfair offers. However, we find
that responders’ experiences from the first part of the experiment are an important reference
point for the types of offers they are willing to accept: In period 1 of the ultimatum game, the
lowest acceptable offer of a responder who started in the PC market is 36% higher than the
lowest acceptable offer of a responder who started in the RC market. That is, responders who
started out in markets in which competition forces proposers to make very favorable offers
to the responders have a much higher standard for what constitutes a fair and acceptable
offer. Moreover, this difference is persistent: over the course of 15 periods of repeated play,
this difference dissipates by only about one-half of its period-one value.
5In the Kahneman et al. study, participants rate the fairness of wage and price changes by firms in
hypothetical scenarios. The majority of questions deal with differing justifications for similar wage or price
changes and analyze how the motives underlying the price change affect the fairness rating. Only one of
the analyzed questions (Question 2, p.730) actually examines the effect of differences in experience on the
acceptability of the same offer, and they find that it is more acceptable for a firm to offer a low wage to a
novel worker when market conditions have changed than offering the same wage to a current employee in
which case the new wage constitutes a wage cut. However, note that in this case different earnings may also
be justified based on differences in productivity.
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In contrast, proposers’ behavior is much less influenced by their phase 1 market experi-
ence, as they quickly learn what responders are willing to accept and adjust their offers to
maximize profits. This result is consistent with a key theoretical prediction of our model:
because past experience affects players’ motives for resisting unfair treatment, it should affect
the behavior of players with little bargaining power who are in a position to be treated un-
fairly, but it should not affect the behavior of players with greater bargaining power, because
they are less likely to have their fairness reference point violated.
Our results have a number of economic implications. First, a key implication of our
work is that fairness preferences are endogenous to market structure. For example, how a
consumer perceives high prices can depend on whether this consumer is accustomed to high
or low prices. This prediction is consistent with the differential perception of the price of
gasoline discussed earlier.6
Second, dynamically adjusting fairness standards imply that consumer outrage following
a price hike may be impermanent, and will subside as consumers adopt the new price as their
reference transaction. Consider, for example, the outrage that followed a 60% price increase
by movie rental company Netflix in July 2011. Starting with angry outcries in various social
media channels,7 this outrage quickly turned into a loss of 800,000 members and a stock
price that plummeted from $291 to $75 over the course of just three and a half months.8
Yet Netflix did not lower prices, and casual observation of the company two years later in
2013—a gain of 3 million new customers, a stock price above $200, and no sign of discontent
over unreasonably high prices—might suggest that consumers eventually adopted the new
prices as the reference transaction.
Third, our findings can help explain empirical observations in labor markets. It is a well
established fact that current labor market conditions have little effect on incumbent workers’
wages (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991; Bewley, 1999; Kaur, 2012). Because workers’ fairness
reference points depend on past experience, lowering wages of existing workers is difficult,
but hiring new workers at lower wages can be feasible. Moreover, our results also provide a
rationale for the long lasting effects of initial labor market conditions and starting wages upon
entering a firm (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Firms take workers’ current fairness reference point
into account during future wage renegotiations, which causes persistent differences in offered
wages based on initial starting conditions. Our results thus provide a potential psychological
6In a similar vein, Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006) show that movers to a new city arriving from more
expensive cities rent pricier apartments than those arriving from cheaper cities.
7http://edition.cnn.com/2011/TECH/social.media/07/22/social.media.outrage.taylor/index.html
8Nick Wingfield and Brian Stelter. 2011. “How Netflix lost 800,000 Members,
and Good Will.” New York Times. October 24, 2011, accessed June 20th, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/technology/netflix-lost-800000-members-with-price-rise-and-split-
plan.html.
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mechanism underlying wage rigidity and persistent wage differentials.9
Fourth, our work contributes to a recent literature on contracts as reference points by
Hart and Moore (2008) (see also Hart, 2009; Hart and Holmstrom, 2010; Fehr et al., 2011b),
who argue that a contract between two parties functions as a reference point that these
parties use to evaluate the fairness of their subsequent outcomes.10 Our notion of reference-
dependent fairness is complimentary, and applies more broadly to environments in which
parties do not have the opportunity to write a contract prior to choosing actions. In fact,
Hart and Moore (2008) discuss extensions of their model in which reference points other
than contractual terms affect parties’ feelings of entitlement. Our work, therefore, paves the
way toward more integrated models of reference-dependent fairness.
Finally, our work contributes to the debate about the effects of policy interventions
on market outcomes. Falk et al. (2006) experimentally show that experimenter-imposed
minimum wage laws can cause spillover effects, raising wages even after the removal of
the minimum wage law, a finding that is also predicted by our theory and consistent with
our results. However, Falk et al. (2006) cannot pin down whether this spillover effect is
directly due workers’ past experiences: because the minimum wage was imposed by the
experimenter, it may have served as a signal of the experimenter’s preferences or beliefs
about social norms.11
Our paper is also broadly related to experimental economics work on learning spillovers
across games. The work on learning spillovers in strategic interactions (Grimm and Mengel,
2012; Bednar et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2011) has shown how beliefs about opponents’ play can
be influenced by observations of play in similar games. But while these papers demonstrate
the importance of learning spillovers in coordination games through belief- or best-response
9See Kaur (2012) and reference therein for recent evidence and a potential source of high unemployment
volatility. See Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) for work relating wage rigidity to unemployment volatility.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2012) propose a model of reference-dependent preferences in a search and matching model
that generates both wage rigidity and unemployment volatility.
10See Fehr et al. (2011a) and Bartling and Schmidt (2012) on the effect of contracts as reference points
on subsequent contract renegotiation.
11That is, experimenter-imposed wage conditions could have created a demand effect or led subjects to
make inferences about social norms or what the experimenter considers to be appropriate behavior. In
contrast, market forces endogenously shape experiences in our design, which allows us to directly attribute
observed treatment differences to experiences. Moreover, because the Falk et al. (2006) design involves a
complex strategic interaction between a firm and multiple workers, the design cannot pin down whether the
outcomes of minimum wage laws shape fairness preferences or simply change players’ beliefs about others’
strategic intentions. (In their design, i) a firm can make up to three wage offers ii) payoffs are nonlinear
in the number of workers accepting and iii) the multiple workers must simultaneously choose to accept or
reject.) For example, how much a worker punishes a firm by rejecting its offer will depend on his belief
about other workers’ acceptance decisions, and his beliefs about the number of offers made by the firm. Or
relatedly, workers who do not want to receive payoffs lower than other workers will not want to obtain zero
payoffs by rejecting a wage offer if they think that other workers will accept offers and thus obtain positive
payoffs.
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bundling, our results demonstrate spillovers that operate at the level of preferences.
More generally, our results link the study of social preferences to the psychology and eco-
nomics literature that argues that preferences are not exogenously given, but are reference-
dependent and constructed from past experience, expectations, or the decision context (Licht-
enstein and Slovic, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Simonson and Tversky, 1992). But
while most existing work on reference-dependence studies how reference points affect the
pricing of risk, the tradeoffs between consumption and effort, or the tradeoffs between dif-
ferent dimensions of consumption, our work shows the importance of reference-dependence
in determining the tradeoff between consumption and fairness.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the games used in
our experiment, and the rest of our experimental design. In section 3 we present a simple
and generally applicable model of path-dependent fairness preferences, which we then use to
motivate a set of hypotheses for our experimental design. In section 4 we present our results,
and find that they are largely consistent with our theoretical predictions. In section 5 we
discuss additional applications and testable predictions of our theory. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
All games in the experiment were based on the asymmetric ultimatum game, first introduced
by Kagel et al. (1996)12, and the market game first introduced by Roth et al. (1991). In each
of these games, 100 chips must be divided between proposers and responders, with proposers
making offers, and responders choosing whether or not to accept the offers. These chips are
then converted into monetary payoffs, with different conversion rates for the proposer and the
responder. In our experiment, the monetary value of each chip was three times as high for a
proposer as it was for a responder.13 Our experimental design consists of three variants of the
asymmetric ultimatum game: (i) Proposer Competition (PC), (ii) Responder Competition
(RC) and (iii) no competition. Subjects participated in one of the two market games for the
first 15 periods of our experiment, and then participated in the non-competitive ultimatum
game in the next 15 periods. We describe the experimental games in more detail below.
12This asymmetric ultimatum game is a variant of the original ultimatum game design first introduced by
Gu¨th et al. (1982).
13We have chosen the asymmetric ultimatum game rather than the standard ultimatum game because
existing evidence on responder behavior shows that the variance in minimum acceptable offers is considerably
larger in the asymmetric ultimatum game than in the standard ultimatum game. Consequently, we considered
the asymmetric ultimatum game to be better suited for treatment manipulations that seek to affect responder
behavior.
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2.1 Phase 1: Market Games
In the first phase of our experiment (first 15 periods), subjects participated in either a
responder competition treatment or in a proposer competition treatment.
In the responder competition (RC) market game, one proposer is matched with two
responders. The proposer first posts an offer of how to divide 100 chips between himself and
a responder. Each responder then observes the offer and, without knowing the decision of
the other responder, chooses whether or not to accept it. If both responders reject the offer,
all three subjects receive zero chips. If one responder accepts the offer and one responder
rejects the offer, the 100 chips are divided according to the proposed division between the
proposer and the responder who accepted the offer. The responder who rejects the offer
receives zero chips. If both responders accept the offer, it is randomly determined which
responder actually receives the offer, and the non-selected responder receives zero chips.
In the proposer competition (PC) market game, two proposers are matched with one
responder. Each proposer first posts an offer of how to divide 100 chips with the responder.
The responder observes both offers and can accept one or none of the offers. If both offers
are rejected, all three subjects receive zero chips. If an offer is accepted, the proposer who
made the offer and the responder receive chips according to the proposed split. The proposer
whose offer was not accepted receives zero chips.
2.2 Phase 2: Ultimatum Game
In the next phase of our experiment (next 15 periods), all subjects participated in a standard
version of the asymmetric ultimatum game for 15 periods. In this version, one proposer is
matched with one responder. First, the proposer makes an offer to the responder. Second,
the responder can accept or reject the offer. We did not elicit responders’ decisions in phase
2 in the same way that we elicited them in phase 1. Before responders were informed about
the actual offer, but after the offer was made, responders stated a minimum acceptable offer
(MAO) amount; that is, each responder stated a number x such that the proposer’s offer is
accepted if and only if he offers at least x chips to the responder. This minimum amount
was binding and directly enforced by the computer. As before, the proposed division of chips
is implemented if and only if the proposer’s offer is accepted, while both subjects get zero
chips if the proposed offer is rejected.14
14Our use of the strategy method in phase 2 but not in phase 1 makes the responders’ choice sets very
different between the two phases. In phase 1, responders are given choices A1 = {accept, reject}, while in
phase 2, they are given choices A2 = {0, 1, . . . , 100}. We did not use this strategy in phase 1, because we
didn’t want to exogenously impose rules about which offer must be chosen under proposer competition. Also,
note that eliciting MAOs is technically not fully equivalent to the strategy method, since a responder’s full
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A key feature of the ultimatum game that we wish to emphasize is that if the responder
cares only about distributions of wealth, then his choice in the ultimatum game is completely
non-strategic in the sense that it reflects only his preferences, and not his beliefs about other
players’ behavior. A proposer’s choice in the ultimatum game, in contrast, reflects not only
his preferences, but also his beliefs about the probability that the responder will accept his
offer. Similarly, in the RC market game, a responder’s utility from rejecting an offer may
depend on whether or not he believes the other responder will accept the offer. Therefore,
differences in responder behavior in the ultimatum game can be attributed to a malleability
of preferences that is not captured by models of exogenously given preferences.
2.3 Procedures
At the beginning of each session, each subject was assigned to the role of proposer or re-
sponder, and this role was fixed throughout the experiment. Just before the first period,
one third of the proposers and two thirds of the responders were randomly assigned to the
proposer competition treatment. The remaining two thirds of the proposers and one third
of the responders were assigned to the responder competition treatment. Subjects stayed in
their respective treatment groups throughout all of phase 1 of the experiment. All subjects
received written instructions for their respective treatment, and were asked to answer several
understanding checks before proceeding with the experiment. After all subjects completed
the instructions and the understanding checks, they were asked to proceed to the first phase
of the experiment. Proposers and responders were randomly rematched within their treat-
ment group after every period. The subjects were told that there would be a second phase
to the experiment, but were told nothing else about it other than that their choices in phase
1 would have no effect on their potential payoffs in phase 2.
Once the first phase of the experiment was finished, subjects received on-screen instruc-
tions for the ultimatum game without competition, and were again asked to work through
several understanding checks. They were then divided into three different matching groups.
Each matching group contained one third of the proposers and one third of the responders
within a session. The first matching group consisted of proposers and responders who had
previously been in the proposer competition treatment (PC Matching Group). The second
matching group consisted of proposers and responders who had previously been in the re-
sponder competition treatment (RC Matching Group). Finally, the third matching group
consisted of the remaining third of proposers who had previously been in the proposer com-
petition treatment and the remaining third of responders who had previously been in the
strategy might be to accept an offer of x but reject an offer y > x. But as long as responders’ acceptance
preferences are monotonic, there is no loss of information in eliciting MAOs.
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responder competition treatment (Mixed Matching Group).
As a naming convention, we will refer to responders and proposers who have previously
participated in the proposer competition market as “PC Responders” and “PC Proposers”,
and to those who have participated in the responder competition market as “RC Responders”
and “RC Proposers”. The composition of the matching groups is summarized in table 1.
Subjects stayed within their respective matching groups throughout all 15 periods, though
the pairs were randomly reshuﬄed every period within each matching group.
Proposer Origin Responder Origin
PC Matching Group PC Proposers PC Responders
RC Matching Group RC Proposers RC Responders
Mixed Matching Group PC Proposers RC Responders
Table 1: Overview of Matching Groups
A key feature of our matching groups is that they allow us to cleanly investigate the effect
of responder experience on bargaining behavior, holding proposer experience constant (by
comparing the PC Matching Group with the Mixed Matching Group). Similarly, it allows
us to investigate the effect of proposer experience on bargaining behavior, holding respon-
der experience constant (by comparing the RC Matching Group with the Mixed Matching
Group).
In addition to each subject’s actions, we also elicited beliefs before periods 1, 6 and 11
in both phases. Responders were asked to estimate the average offer made by proposers in
the next five periods. Proposers were asked to estimate the median acceptance threshold
of responders.15 To avoid wealth effects potentially confounding or interfering with our
treatment manipulation, either phase 1 or phase 2 was selected for payment at the end of
the experiment. Within the chosen phase, 4 periods were selected at random.16 The points
earned in the selected periods were then converted into Swiss Francs, with the exchange rate
of points to Swiss Francs set at 10:1.
In total, we ran 5 sessions totaling to 150 subjects. Because difference in past experience
are a crucial variable in our design, we only invited subjects who have not previously par-
ticipated in ultimatum game experiments. Sessions consisted of either 24, 30 or 36 subjects
and were conducted in October and November 2012. Experiments were computerized using
the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the experimental laboratory of the
15We did not incentivize the belief elicitation, and we only asked for beliefs every 5 periods for time reasons.
In the proposer competition treatment, proposers were asked to additionally assume that the offer is the
larger of the two offers made.
16We selected 4 periods rather than 1 to reduce the variance in subject payments in case phase 1 of the
experiment was selected for payment (which otherwise would have been very large). This was necessary to
comply with the payment rules of the laboratory.
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University of Zurich. Our subject pool consisted primarily of students at Zurich University
and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.17 On average, an experimental session
lasted 75 minutes with an average payment of CHF 43.5 ($47.50), including a show-up fee
of CHF 15.
3 Theory and Hypothesis Development
In this section we present a simple and generally-applicable model of path-dependent fairness
preferences to motivate our hypotheses.
3.1 Set-up
We begin by investigating the behavior of fairness-motivated players over the course of two
phases. In phase 1, proposers and responders are matched to play either the PC market
game or the RC market game. In phase 2, the players are randomly rematched to play a
non-competitive ultimatum game, such that no player is matched with a player he interacted
with in phase 1. In section 3.5 we extend the model to a setting in which subjects play for
multiple periods in phase 1, and then play again for multiple periods in phase 2.
The fairness view of a player i depends on his reference point ri, which dictates what
share of the ‘total pie’ the player feels entitled to. In particular, if pi1, pi2, . . . pin are the
resulting material payoffs of the players, then the utility of player i in any n-person game is
given by
ui(pii, pi−i|ri) = pii − λmax
[
ri(n)
(
n∑
j=1
pij
)
− pii, 0
]
, (1)
where pi−i is the vector of payoffs of all players j 6= i, and where ri(n) denotes the share of
the surplus that player i feels entitled to in an n-person game. Notice that the total pie in
equation (1) is determined as the sum of ex-post payoffs.
We assume that, in phase 1, players begin with identical reference points r1i (n) = 1/n
for all i. In phase 2, players update their reference points based on their phase 1 experience.
Let
µ1i =
pi1i∑n
j=1 pi
1
j
(2)
be player i’s share of the pie in phase 1, and set µ1i = 0 if
∑n
j=1 pi
1
j = 0.
18 Then player i’s
17Subjects were drawn from a database of volunteers using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
18Without having any qualitative implications for our results, one can relax this assumption to setting
µ1i = x if
∑n
j=1 pi
1
j = 0, with x ∈ [0, 1/n].
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phase 2 reference point r2i in a m-person game is given by
r2i (m) = (1− γ)(1/m) + γµ1i . (3)
When γ = 0, the players’ fairness preferences are not affected by their experience, and
the model reduces to a simple model of static distributional preferences, similar to the
models introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). But when
γ > 0, players’ fairness preferences are affected by their past experience, leading to a mode
of dynamic distributional preferences. In particular, in the extreme that γ = 1, phase 2
preferences are completely determined by past experience.
As in our experimental design, we assume linear payoff functions. Throughout our theo-
retical results, we will assume that a proposer whose offer a gets accepted receives a payoff of
k(Y − a) for some constant k > 0, and that the responder accepting that offer gets a payoff
of a. Offers will be restricted to be in the set A = [0, Y ].
3.2 Equilibrium in the PC Market in Phase 1
We begin our analysis with the phase 1 PC market.
Our first result is that when there is proposer competition, the proposers are forced to
make competitive offers at which they make zero profits. This result resembles the results
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), who were the first to provide
a theoretical account of how competitive pressures can mask agents’ preferences for equal
distributions.
Proposition 1. In any (possibly mixed-strategy) SPE of the PC market game, at least one
of the proposers offers a = Y , and the responder accepts one of the offers with probability
1. When restricting attention to pure-strategy SPEs, there is a unique equilibrium in which
both proposers offer a = Y .
The proof of Proposition 1, as well as all subsequent proofs, is contained in Appendix
C. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the usual Bertrand competition logic. Suppose a
proposer i offers some ai < Y and this offer is accepted with probability p > 0. Then the
other proposer j certainly can’t do better by offering aj < ai. But offering aj = ai is not
optimal either. Proposer i can do strictly better by offering ai +  for an arbitrarily small ,
and thus increasing the probability that his offer is accepted by p > 0, while decreasing his
payoff conditional on acceptance by an arbitrarily small amount.
Notice that in the PC market, the equilibrium offers are not affected by the reference
transaction, and thus would not be affected by past experience. This does not mean, however,
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that the responder’s minimum acceptable offer would not be affected by past experience in
the PC market. The smallest offer a responder would be willing to accept in any subgame
of the PC market game (including subgames that are off of the equilibrium path) is still
determined by his reference point.
3.3 Equilibrium in the RC Market in Phase 1
Next, we characterize equilibria in the RC market game. The proposition that follows shows
that in the RC market, an offer of a = 0 can always be supported as an SPE outcome,
though there is a multiplicity of equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to the fact
that our model gives rise to a coordination game between the responders: for a wide range
of parameters, it is optimal for responder i to accept an offer if and only if he thinks that the
other responder will accept the offer. The source of this strategic complementarity between
the responders’ acceptance decisions is the behindness aversion assumed in the fairness pref-
erences: a responder derives disutility whenever an unfair proposer gets to transact with
another responder.
Proposition 2. An offer a in the RC market game can be supported as an SPE if and only
if a ∈
[
0, λkY
3+(2+k)λ
]
.
Notice that in the RC market, a zero offers equilibrium is possible, and the highest
possible offers that can be sustained in equilibrium are still significantly lower than the
equilibrium offers from the PC market. In particular, even as λ→∞, the highest sustainable
offers are still no larger than kY
2+k
, meaning that proposers still get less than 1/3 of the total
surplus.19
3.4 Phase 2 Behavior
To simplify exposition for the main body of the paper, we assume that in the RC market
game, players coordinate on the equilibrium in which proposers offer 0.20
We begin by examining how responders’ phase 2 acceptance thresholds are shaped by
their phase 1 market experience. A key comparative static parameter will be γ—the weight
that players’ phase 1 experience has in shaping their phase 2 fairness preferences.
19In particular, λkY3+(2+k)λ is increasing in λ and limλ→∞
λkY
3+(2+k)λ =
kY
2+k . Now if the proposer offers
a = kY2+k and this offer is accepted, then his total payoff is 2
kY
2+k , from which it follows that the responder
gets 1/3 fo the total sum of payoffs.
20Appendix C includes a more detailed analysis in which we investigate phase 2 behavior for each possible
equilibrium of the RC market game. It is shown that the qualitative conclusions remain identical.
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Proposition 3. Let MPC(γ) (MRC(γ)) be the minimal acceptable offer of a PC (RC) re-
sponder as a function of γ. Then
1. MPC(0) = MRC(0)
2. MPC(γ) is strictly increasing in γ
3. MRC(γ) is strictly decreasing in γ
The key prediction of Proposition 3 is that the higher the impact of past experience on
responders’ fairness reference points, the greater will be the difference between the MAOs
of PC and RC responders. When no weight is given to past experience, both PC and RC
responders will have identical distributional preferences, as in standard models of fairness.
But as the weight γ increases, the MAOs of PC responders rise, while the MAOs of RC
responders fall.
We now compare the behavior of RC and PC proposers. In our next result, we examine
how proposers’ strategies are impacted by their Phase 1 experience and by their beliefs about
the responders’ behavior.
Proposition 4. A PC proposer always offers MPC(γ) to a PC responder, and offers MRC(γ)
to a RC responder. A RC proposer always offers MRC(γ) to a RC responder. Finally, there
exists a γ† ∈ (0, 1] such that
1. If γ ≤ γ† then a RC proposer always offers MPC(γ) to a PC responder
2. If γ ∈ (γ†, 1) then a RC proposer offers a < MPC(γ) to a PC responder
Proposition 4 says that PC proposers, who are used to receiving a very small share of
the surplus, are predicted to act in a profit-maximizing manner and will thus offer each type
of responder the smallest amount that responder is willing to accept. RC proposers, on the
other hand, are used to receiving a larger share of the pie, and may not be happy with a
division of surplus in which they don’t get most of the pie. When an RC proposer is matched
with a PC responder, there might, therefore, not be any division of the pie that both would
find acceptable. In such a situation, an RC proposer would make an offer that would simply
end in a rejection by the PC responder, as reflected in the last statement of Proposition 4.
However, an RC proposer and an RC responder can always come to an agreement, since an
RC responder is used to receiving very little of the surplus. In this situation, an RC proposer
will make an offer equal to the smallest amount the RC responder is willing to accept.
Proposition 4 thus shows that RC proposers and PC proposers will always make identical
offers to the RC responder. That is, when matched with an RC responder, proposers’ Phase 1
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experience has absolutely no impact on their strategy. When matched with a PC responder,
RC proposers may make smaller offers than PC proposers for a high enough parameter γ.
Note, however, that our experimental design investigates only three of the four inter-
actions that are considered in Proposition 4 (see Table 1 for a summary of the matching
groups). In particular, we never match PC responders with RC proposers.21 Thus Proposi-
tion 4 predicts that proposers’ Phase 1 experience should not affect their strategies in our
experimental design, as both types of proposers will choose strategies based solely on respon-
ders’ phase 1 experience, simply offering the smallest amount their partner will be willing to
accept.
3.5 Convergence
The stylized two-phase environment we have considered so far illustrates our model’s pre-
dictions for how exposure to our two different markets affects subsequent behavior in the
non-competitive ultimatum game. We now consider a more dynamic model in which players
have the opportunity to repeatedly participate in the phase 1 market games and the phase
2 ultimatum game. The key question we ask is how behavior, and the effects of different
market experiences, will change as players continue to repeatedly play the ultimatum game.
We consider play in periods t = −T, . . . , 0, 1, 2, . . .∞. In periods t = −T, . . . , 0, players
participate in some n player game (possibly one of the market games), while in periods
t = 1, 2, . . . players participate in a non-competitive ultimatum game. As before, we let µti
denote the share of the pie that player i received in period t, and set µti = 0 if all n players
received zero payoffs in the respective period.
In period t = −T , player i’s reference point in an n person game is given by µ−Ti = 1/n.
In periods t > −T , the reference point of player i in an n-player game is given by
rti = (1− γ)(1/n) + γ
t−1∑
τ=−T
µτi
t+ T
. (4)
Notice that equation (4) is a generalization of equation (3) to a setting with more than two
periods. In the more general definition (4), the reference point is a convex combination of
the ‘neutral reference point’ 1/n and the average of past experience. While we feel that the
unweighted average of past experience is a natural input into the reference point, it is by
no means the only natural specification, nor is it crucial for our results. In Appendix C, we
show that all results remain unchanged for any weighted average of past experiences, as long
21Since PC responders and RC proposers are always scarce in each session, such a matching group would
have been prohibitively costly. Hence, we decided to focus on the other three matching groups.
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as a more recent experience gets at least as much weight as an older experience.
We consider the evolution of play between a proposer and a responder in periods t > 0.
We let rtP and r
t
R denote the proposer’s and responder’s period t > 0 reference points. We
assume that each period, proposers and responders have perfect information about each
others’ reference points, and play an SPE of the non-competitive ultimatum game. We let
M t denote the minimal acceptable offer of a responder i in period t > 0, and let at denote
the proposer’s period t > 0 offer.
Throughout this analysis, we will be concerned with steady state preferences and strate-
gies:
Definition 1. A steady state is a pair of strategies (a∗,M∗) and reference points (r∗P , r
∗
R)
such that
1. (a∗,M∗) is an SPE of the ultimatum game in which players have the fairness reference
points (r∗P , r
∗
R)
2. r∗P = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ pi
∗
P
pi∗P+pi
∗
R
and r∗R = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ pi
∗
R
pi∗P+pi
∗
R
, where pi∗P and pi
∗
R are the
proposer’s and responder’s steady state SPE payoffs
Our main result in this section is that there is a unique steady state to which play always
converges:
Proposition 5. Assume that γ < 1. Then there is a unique steady state 〈(a∗,M∗), (r∗P , r∗R)〉.
In the steady state, a∗ > 0, a∗ < k(W − a∗), and a∗ = M∗. Moreover, this steady state is
globally stable. That is, for any set of initial experiences {µti}0t=−T , preferences and strategies
converge to the steady state:
lim
t→∞
rtP = r
∗
P and lim
t→∞
rtR = r
∗
R
lim
t→∞
at = a∗ and lim
t→∞
M t = M∗
Proposition 5 shows that if players have enough experience in the ultimatum game en-
vironment, then their fairness preferences in that environment can be characterized as a
fixed point of an adjustment dynamic. In fact, Proposition 5 shows that our model uniquely
pins down what the steady-state fairness preferences can be—the steady state is unique.
The only assumption needed to guarantee uniqueness is that γ < 1: that is, that players’
fairness preferences are not completely (though perhaps arbitrarily close to) determined by
past experience.
A final prediction of the model is that when players have extreme past experiences as
in our market conditions, convergence to the steady state will be monotonic. That is,
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PC responders should monotonically decrease their MAOs, while RC responders should
monotonically increase their MAOs:
Proposition 6. Assume that γ < 1 and that
∑0
t=−T µ
t
R
T+1
+
∑0
t=−T µ
t
P
T+1
≤ 1.
1. If
∑0
t=−T µ
t
R
T+1
< r∗R, then for all t > 0, M
t < r∗R but is strictly increasing in t.
2. If
∑0
t=−T µ
t
R
T+1
> r∗R, then for all t > 0, M
t > r∗R but is strictly decreasing in t.
Proposition 6 simply says that even though responders’ MAOs should not reach steady
state levels in a finite number of periods, the effect of past market experience should still
diminish over time.
3.6 Discussion of Assumptions
To keep the analysis as simple and clear as possible, we make several simplifying assumptions
in the model that are almost surely at odds with behavior in our experiment. In particular,
we make the extreme assumption that players derive disutility when their share of the pie
falls short of their reference point, but they do not derive disutility from receiving a dispro-
portionately large share of the pie. Incorporating such a motive would weaken the statement
of Proposition 4. However, as long proposers derive greater disutility from falling short of
their reference point than from exceeding it, the qualitative prediction of Proposition 4 will
still hold: that is, proposers’ strategies will depend more on responders’ Phase 1 experience
than on their own Phase 1 experience.
3.7 Testable Hypotheses
Our theoretical results lead to a number of testable hypotheses. We begin by enumerating
the hypotheses for Phase 1 of the experiment.
H1 In the PC market, proposers will offer most of the pie. In the RC market, proposers
will offer significantly less than proposers in the PC market.
The first part of hypothesis H1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 1: because of
Bertrand-style competition, proposers cannot maintain positive material surplus. The second
part of hypothesis H1 is a consequence of Proposition 2. While proposition 2 does not pin
down a unique equilibrium, it does say that even the largest possible equilibrium offer is far
below the predicted equilibrium in the PC market, and it says that even offers of zero can
be supported as an equilibrium in the RC market.
We next turn to hypotheses for Phase 2 of the experiment.
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H2.1 Responders from the PC market will have higher MAOs than responders from the RC
market
H2.2 Proposers who have learned from Phase 2 experience what responders in their match-
ing group are willing to accept will offer more to PC responders than to RC responders.
H2.3 Proposers who have learned from Phase 2 experience what responders in their match-
ing group are willing to accept will not be affected by their Phase 1 market experience.
H2.4 Differences in Responders’ strategies due to Phase 1 experience will diminish over
time, but will not be completely eliminated.
Hypothesis H2.1 is formally derived in Proposition 3, and is a basic consequence of
assuming that preferences are path-dependent.
Hypothesis H2.2 is derived in Proposition 4, and is a consequence of Proposers’ profit-
maximization motives: proposers should offer less to responders who are willing to accept
less. We expect H2.2 to be in full force after a few periods of play, once Proposers have a
chance to learn what offers responders are willing to accept.
Hypothesis H2.3, also motivated by Proposition 4, complements H2.2 and says that
proposers’ own experience in Phase 1 should play no role in their strategies once they have
an opportunity to learn about responders’ preferences. Initially, it is possible that proposers’
Phase 1 experience may affect their beliefs about responder behavior, and thus affect their
strategies. But when proposers learn about responders’ strategies, Proposition 4’s prediction
that proposers’ Phase 1 experience will not affect their strategies should be in full force.
Hypothesis H2.4 is directly motivated by Proposition 6, which states that with experience,
proposers’ reference points should monotonically converge toward the steady-state reference
point.
4 Results
In this section, we present our experimental evidence for path-dependent fairness preferences.
We begin in subsection 4.1 by analyzing differences in behavior between the RC and PC
markets: as expected, we find that offers in the PC market are significantly higher than offers
in the RC market. In subsection 4.2 we turn to the analysis of phase 2 of the experiment,
and investigate how differences in phase 1 experience affect responder behavior in phase
2. In subsection 4.3 we investigate how differences in phase 1 experience affect proposers’
offers. Finally, in subsection 4.4 we investigate to what extent responders’ fairness preferences
converge over time.
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4.1 Phase 1: The Effect of Competition on Offers and Acceptance
Decisions
We find strong evidence that competition affects offers in the first phase of our experiment.
Averaged over all 15 periods, proposers offer 78 chips to responders in the PC market,
whereas they offer only 31 chips to responders in the RC market. The development of offers
over the course of the 15 periods in both treatments is shown in the left panel of figure 1.
The difference between offers in the two treatments is roughly 23 chips in period 1, and
increases over time until it reaches an average of 50 chips from period 7 onwards. To assess
the statistical significance of this difference, we use a clustered version of the rank-sum test
proposed by Datta and Satten (2005), which controls for potential dependencies between
observations. Clustering on the treatment group in phase 1, we find that the difference in
individual average offers is highly significant (p < 0.01, clustered rank sum test)22
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Figure 1: Left Panel: Average offers over time under responder competition and under pro-
poser competition in phase 1 of the experiment. Right Panel: Acceptance rates of responders
over time under responder competition and under proposer competition in phase 1 of the
experiment.
Despite these large differences in offers, the right panel of figure 1 shows that the probabil-
ity that an offer is accepted does not differ much by treatment. In the PC market, responders
accept one of the two offers in 99.2 percent of the time. In the RC market, responders accept
the offers 76.8 percent of the time, and the probability that at least one of the responders
accepts an offer is 92.5 percent. Thus in both markets, a successful transaction occurs over
22While we present clustered rank-sum tests in the text, we also present p-values using standard rank sum
tests that do not account for the potential dependencies between observations within matching groups in
table 6 in Appendix A as a benchmark. It can be seen that the p-values of the standard test are in general
slightly smaller, but very comparable to the p-values from the clustered test presented in the text.
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90 percent of the time. Our stark experimental results on the affects of competitive forces are
consistent with Roth et al. (1991) and Fischbacher et al. (2009) and confirm our hypothesis
1. We summarize them in the following result:
Result 1. Competition among responders leads to low offers, whereas competition among
proposers leads to high offers in the market version of the ultimatum game. Despite facing
relatively low offers, responders in the responder competition market accept offers with a high
frequency.
4.2 Phase 2: The Effect of Experience on Responder Behavior
Hypothesis H2.1 states that PC responders have higher acceptance thresholds than RC
responders. The left panel of figure 2 provides our first piece of evidence in favor of the
hypothesis. In every period of the bargaining game, average minimal acceptable offers are
larger for PC Responders. The difference is particularly pronounced in early periods. In
period 1, the difference in the average acceptance threshold between the two treatment groups
is 13 chips, which translates to PC Responders stating minimum acceptance thresholds that
are 36 percent higher than the acceptance thresholds of RC Responders.
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Figure 2: Minimal Acceptance Thresholds of responders. “PC Responders” denotes respon-
ders who have been exposed to proposer competition in phase 1. “RC Responders” denotes
responders who have been exposed to responder competition in phase 1 of the experiment.
The left panel shows average minimum acceptable offers over the course of the second part
of the experiment. The right panel shows the respective medians. Dashed lines show linear
time trends.
To assess the statistical significance of this difference, we again use the clustered version
of the rank-sum test in order to control for potential dependencies between observations
stemming from phase 1 of the experiment. Clustering on the treatment group in phase 1,
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the difference in minimum acceptance thresholds in the first period is significant (p = 0.03,
clustered rank-sum test). On average over all 15 periods, the difference is 8.6 chips (p =
0.06, clustered rank-sum test using individual average acceptance thresholds as the unit of
observation), which translates to PC responders stating minimum acceptance thresholds that
are 24 percent higher.
The right panel of figure 2 shows that a similar picture emerges when comparing the me-
dian minimum acceptance thresholds across the two treatment groups. The median minimum
acceptance threshold of the PC responders is consistently larger than the median minimum
acceptance threshold of the RC responders, and the treatment effect is very consistent over
time. A ranksum test using median acceptance thresholds of each treatment group in each
session as the unit of observation (N = 10) reveals that the difference in medians is also
significant (p < 0.02).
The data shown in figure 2, however, does not account for differences in past experience of
the proposer. To control for potential effects of proposer experience on responder behavior,
we have to exploit the exogenous variation in matching group composition in phase 2 of
the experiment. As we explained in section 2, our different matching groups in phase 2 of
the experiment allow us to perform such an analysis. Figure 3 shows the development of
minimum acceptance thresholds over time in phase 2 of the experiment for the three different
matching groups. While the solid line exactly corresponds to the PC responder plot in figure
2, the two dotted lines disaggregate the RC responders based on their matching groups. It
can again be seen that minimum acceptance thresholds in the PC matching group remain
permanently above the minimum acceptance thresholds of the other two groups. Moreover,
the two matching groups with RC responders are not significantly different from each other
(p = 0.44, clustered rank-sum test using individual average acceptance thresholds as the unit
of observation).
To statistically assess potential differences in responder behavior conditional on responder
and proposer experience, we turn to regression analysis. Table 2 shows coefficients of a
regression of minimum acceptance thresholds on a dummy variable indicating whether a
responder participated in the PC market in phase 1 (PC Responder) and a dummy variable
indicating whether the matched proposer participated in the PC market in phase 1 (PC
Proposer). Hence, PC Responder captures the effect of responder experience, whereas PC
Proposer captures the effect of proposer experience.
Table 2 clearly shows that only responder experience has a significant effect. This effect
is particularly pronounced in the first period, and weakens when all periods are considered
in the regression. We will return to the issue of convergence in subsection 4.4. Our evidence
on responder behavior is summarized in the next result:
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Figure 3: Mean and Median Minimal Acceptance Thresholds of responders, by matching
group.
Table 2: Minimum acceptable offers by experience
First Period All
(1) (2)
PC Responder 15.400** 10.187*
(5.665) (4.921)
PC Proposer –4.800 –3.227
(6.777) (7.490)
Constant 38.400*** 37.413***
(4.165) (4.675)
Adj. R2 0.059 0.041
Observations 75 1125
OLS Regressions; Clustering by treatment groups. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
Result 2. Responders who have been exposed to proposer competition in phase 1 have a
higher minimal acceptance threshold than responders who have been exposed to responder
competition in phase 1. The experience of matched proposers has no substantial impact on
responder behavior.
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4.3 The Effect of Experience on Proposer Behavior
Our theoretical framework also makes predictions about proposer behavior. Hypothesis
H2.2 states that proposers should tailor their phase 2 offers to the responders’ past phase 1
experience. Hypothesis H2.3 states that once proposers have an opportunity to learn about
responders’ behavior, proposers should not be affected by their own phase 1 experience at
all. We now investigate these hypotheses.
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Figure 4: Mean and Median offers of proposers, by matching group.
The left panel of figure 4 shows average offers in the different matching groups over time,
and the right hand panel shows the respective median offers by matching group over time.
It can immediately be seen that, in the first period, proposer origin affects proposer offers.
While the mean and median offer is roughly equivalent in the two matching groups with PC
proposers, RC proposers make lower offers in period 1. However, mean and median offers of
PC proposers seem to diverge, whereas mean and median offers of the RC proposers appear
to converge to the level of the PC proposers who are matched with RC responders. To assess
the relevance of proposer and responder experience on proposers’ offers, we again turn to
regression analysis.
Table 3 shows a regression of offers on a dummy variable indicating whether a responder
participated in the PC market in phase 1 (PC Responder) and a dummy variable indicating
whether the matched proposer participated in the PC market in phase 1 (PC Proposer).
Column (1) shows that proposers’ phase 1 experience is an important determinant of their
first period offers. When aggregating over all 15 periods, however, the effect is completely
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Table 3: Proposer Offers
First Period All
(1) (2)
PC Responder –1.000 8.813*
(3.835) (3.927)
PC Proposer 12.400*** 1.613
(2.461) (2.541)
Constant 36.600*** 45.853***
(2.836) (3.049)
Adj. R2 0.068 0.106
Observations 75 1125
OLS Regressions; Clustering by treatment groups. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
reversed. The coefficient on PC Proposer becomes insignificant, whereas the coefficient on PC
Responder becomes larger and significant (p = 0.051). Thus, once proposers have learned
the preferences of the responders with whom they are matched, their phase 1 experience
becomes completely irrelevant. We summarize these findings in the following result:
Result 3 (Offers are Primarily Driven by Responder Experience). Overall, proposers’ expe-
rience in phase 1 of the experiment has very little impact on their offers in phase 2 of the
experiment. Responders’ phase 1 experience, however, significantly impacts proposers’ offers
in phase 2 of the experiment.
Data on proposers’ beliefs further supports the conclusion that proposers’ offers in phase
2 are strongly affected by their beliefs about responders’ minimum acceptance thresholds in
phase 2. In Periods 1, 6 and 11, proposers were asked to state their belief about responders’
median acceptance threshold. Table 4 shows regressions of this believed median acceptance
threshold on proposer and responder experience dummies.
PC Proposers initially believe in higher acceptance thresholds, but the difference is not
statistically significant. However, in period 6 and 11 the effect of proposer experience on
believed acceptance thresholds vanishes. Responder experience, however, increasingly affects
the believed median acceptance threshold. While it initially has no effect in period 1, being
matched with a PC responder leads to significantly higher beliefs in median acceptance
thresholds in periods 6 and 11. This evidence is consistent with proposers offering higher
amounts when being matched with PC responders.
The fact that proposers’ offers are strongly shaped by their beliefs about responder be-
havior is also consistent with our theoretical predication that proposer behavior is driven
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Table 4: Proposers’ Beliefs About Acceptance
Period 1 Period 6 Period 11
(1) (2) (3)
PC Proposer 6.600 0.600 –4.400
(9.995) (4.264) (5.237)
PC Responder 6.800 12.000* 15.800***
(10.449) (4.341) (2.736)
Constant 35.000*** 44.000*** 46.800***
(4.657) (3.463) (4.558)
Adj. R2 0.050 0.149 0.199
Observations 75 75 75
OLS Regressions; Clustering by treatment groups. Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
by the maximization of monetary payoffs. To further investigate this prediction, we com-
pute the optimal offers for each period (and by matching group) in appendix B, and find
that proposers’ actual offers are very close to the optimal offers (both in magnitudes and
statistically).
4.4 Convergence of Fairness Preferences
Next, we turn to the persistence of the effects of experience on proposers and responders over
time. According to Hypothesis 2.4, the difference between PC and RC responders’ MAOs
should diminish over time. In this section, we analyze how quickly this convergence occurs,
if at all. The fitted lines in figure 2 suggest that there is a negative trend in minimum
acceptable offers for responders who have been exposed to proposer competition in the first
part of the experiment. This observation is confirmed by regression analysis in column (1)
of table 5.
The difference in acceptance thresholds between the two treatment groups is decreasing by
an average of .44 chips per period, which is approximately 3.6 percent of the initial difference.
This attenuation of the difference appears to be mainly driven by responders from the PC
treatment group slowly decreasing their acceptance thresholds over time (see the significant
negative time trend in column (1)). Responders from the responder competition treatment
group, however, do not change their acceptance thresholds over time. We summarize these
findings in our final Result:
Result 4 (Gradual Convergence of Fairness Preferences). The difference in acceptance
thresholds is fairly persistent, but gradually decreasing over time.
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Table 5: Time Trends in Minimum Acceptance Thresholds
(1)
PC Responder 12.093**
(4.296)
PC Responder×period –0.440*
(0.222)
Period –0.126
(0.182)
Constant 36.811***
(2.449)
Adj. R2 0.041
Observations 1125
OLS regressions; Clustering by treatment groups
4.5 Discussion of Results
Do Experiences or Expectations Shape the Reference Point?
In the theoretical development of our hypotheses, we have assumed that fairness reference
points correspond to past experiences. Alternatively, following the approach by Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) in the domain of consumption and risk preferences, it is possible
that reference points correspond to expectations. Applied to fairness preferences, it may be
that a responder chooses to reject a proposer’s offer when that offer falls far short of what
the responder expected.
A model of rational expectations along the lines of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009)
would not predict our results. Once players learn which game they will be participating in
for the subsequent 15 periods, their rational expectations about outcomes should not depend
on their phase 1 experiences.23
Another possibility is that a model of naive, rather than rational, expectations might be
generating the differences in responders’ phase 2 behavior. Although one is faced with many
degrees of freedom in formulating a generally-applicable theory of naive expectations that
can explain how beliefs in one game are shaped by outcomes in a previous game, one of the
23Rational expectations should only be shaped by knowledge of the game structure, and beliefs about
other players’ types. And since rational players should not have their beliefs systematically biased by play in
different games, these rational players should not have different beliefs about each others’ types as a result of
playing different games in Phase 1. Of course, it may be possible to accommodate our results with a model in
which there are multiple rational expectations equilibria and past experience serves as a coordination device
for selecting an equilibrium. However, we do not find such an explanation particularly satisfactory, since it
amounts to assuming a model with enough degrees of freedom in its predictions such that our data can’t
falsify it. A more satisfactory account would have our empirical results as a prediction.
24
many possible formulations is similar to our model. A model in which players’ expectations
are a convex combination of the shares of the surplus that they have received in the past
could generate patterns similar to the patterns observed in our data. In that sense, our
model can be viewed as a tractable and reduced-form approach to formalizing the behavior
of a player whose experiences shape his naive beliefs, which in turn affect preferences.24
We want to point out, however, that a model in which naive beliefs shape the fairness
reference point would have trouble explaining the stark difference between responders’ ad-
justment of their phase 2 behavior and proposers’ adjustment of their phase 2 behavior (see
Figures 3 and 4). As we discussed in detail, proposer behavior suggests that our subjects
are actually very fast to learn how other subjects behave in the game they are playing. By
period 5, proposers’ phase 1 experience has absolutely no impact on their behavior. Given
such fast learning, a theory in which differences in responders’ behavior are due solely to
differences in their naive expectations would seem to be mismatched with the persistent
difference in MAOs that we observe in our data (see Figure 3).25
Fairness Reference Points or Anchoring Heuristics?
Experimental evidence has shown that individuals can be influenced by arbitrary anchors
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Ariely et al., 2003; Simonson
and Tversky, 1992), and that behavior that appears to be consistent with expressing a
particular preference can in fact be the result of arbitrary anchoring.26 Could it then be
that our results are the consequence of a simple anchoring heuristic rather than evidence for
reference-dependent fairness preferences?
Two pieces of evidence suggest that our results are not due to simple anchoring. First, we
demonstrate that past experience only has persistent effects on responder behavior, whereas
proposers quickly adapt to the new environment. This differential response to the treatment
is inconsistent with a simple anchoring heuristic, whereas our theory of reference-dependent
fairness preferences precisely predicts such behavior.
24A responder’s naive beliefs might literally be dictated by a his past shares of the surplus—thus corre-
sponding exactly to our mathematical model—or the beliefs might be a convex combination of the offers the
responder observes—thus corresponding to a minor variation of our model that generate identical results.
25We should also point out that while a theory of expectations as reference points is the most similar
to our model, similar considerations apply to belief-based reciprocity models (Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). In these models players’ motivations depend on their second-order
beliefs about actions (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) or on first-order beliefs about types
(Levine, 1998). Again, a theory of reciprocity and rational beliefs would not be consistent with our results.
But when combined with certain types of non-rational beliefs, these theories may come closer to rationalizing
our results. However, all of our arguments in this subsection would apply to these hybrid models as well.
26See, however, Fudenberg et al. (2012) and List et al. (2013) for evidence questioning the robustness of
these anchoring effects.
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Second, we collected data on individual cognitive abilities using the cognitive reflection
test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005). The CRT is a cognitive test that seems particularly suited
to assess the proneness to the anchoring heuristic. In the CRT, subjects have to answer
questions that have an intuitive but wrong answer. Individuals who fall for fast and frugal
heuristics are likely to score low on the CRT. Table 7 in appendix A shows coefficients for
regressions of the minimum acceptance threshold on phase 1 experience, CRT scores and the
interaction of the treatment with the CRT score in period 1 of phase 2 of the experiment, in
which anchoring should be particularly pronounced. If our subjects were following a simple
anchoring heuristic, we would expect that the treatment effect is particularly pronounced
for individuals scoring low on the CRT. It turns out that the statistically insignificant point
estimate of the interaction between CRT score and treatment has the opposite sign.
5 Concluding Remarks
While most existing work on social preferences has progressed under the presumption of static
preferences, we show that fairness preferences are malleable and endogenous to the economic
forces that determine market outcomes. We also demonstrate that such malleability can be
incorporated into economic theory in a disciplined generalizable way: the parsimonious and
generally applicable model we propose incorporates the path-dependent nature of preferences
at the cost of just one additional degree of freedom, and predicts uniquely determined long-
run outcomes in the games we consider.
We view our experimental and theoretical work as a first step towards understanding
the dynamic nature of fairness preferences, paving the way for a number of other theoretical
and empirical questions to be addressed by future research. One important set of questions
concerns the foundations of path dependence. Although our results would not be predicted
by a model in which agents form rational beliefs and derive utility from those beliefs, our
mathematical framework and experimental results are not meant to distinguish between
whether experience is a direct input into preferences, or whether the input is beliefs that are
shaped by the past experiences of boundedly-rational agents. We plan to investigate this
question in future work.
While past experience does not appear to affect proposers’ prosociality in our empirical re-
sults, a relationship between prosociality and past experience may exist in other contexts. In
concurrent work, Peysakhovich and Rand (2013) demonstrate that immersing subjects in en-
vironments that support cooperation in the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) sub-
stantially impacts subjects’ norms of prosociality in subsequent interactions. Peysakhovich
and Rand (2013) find that subjects who have previously experienced cooperative outcomes
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are more likely to cooperate across a broad array of one-shot games such as the dictator and
trust games, and are also more likely to punish selfishness in third-party punishment games.
Interestingly, Peysakhovich and Rand (2013) find no effect on retaliation in the ultimatum
game, which suggests that there may be important nuances in how past experience shapes
retaliatory versus cooperative motivations. We believe this to be an important theoretical
and empirical question for future research.27
Our work also raises intriguing questions about the market consequences of dynamic
fairness preferences. For example, what are the implications of path-dependent fairness
preferences for how a firm would optimally choose its dynamic price schedule? Our work
implies that a trade-off exists between the immediate loss of customers whose fairness refer-
ence point is violated, and the long run profits generated through the increased willingness
to pay of customers once the reference point has adjusted. And unlike theories of reference
dependence that do not invoke fairness preferences—but in line with the insights of Kahne-
man et al. (1986)—our framework implies that consumers will react very differently to prices
increases that are exploitations of market power, as opposed to price increases necessitated
by rising costs of production.
The effect of experience on fairness perceptions in labor markets may also cause wage
rigidities and create excessive unemployment volatility. Finally, the path-dependence of
fairness preferences may also help to shed light on the differences in beliefs and attitudes
that we observe across different cultures and institutions.
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Appendices
A Additional tables
Table 6: P-Values of Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests
Test p-value
Average offers in phase 1: PC Market vs. RC Market p < 0.01
First Period MAO’s in Phase 2: PC Responders vs. RC Responders p = 0.018
Average MAO’s in Phase 2: PC Responders vs. RC Responders p = 0.062
Average MAO’s in Phase 2: Matching Group 2 vs. Matching Group 3 p = 0.38
Table 7: Minimum Acceptance Thresholds and Cognitive Reflection Test Scores
First Period All Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RC –13.000** –13.851*** –11.878 –8.573* –9.286** –4.042
(4.208) (4.113) (7.585) (3.946) (3.670) (5.098)
CRT 5.317*** 6.110* 4.453*** 6.561**
(1.222) (3.127) (1.054) (2.349)
RC*CRT –1.117 –2.968
(3.335) (2.573)
Constant 49.000*** 39.854*** 38.490*** 44.373*** 36.714*** 33.089***
(3.051) (4.231) (6.941) (3.624) (3.706) (4.554)
Adj. R2 0.064 0.119 0.107 0.038 0.091 0.095
Observations 75 75 75 1125 1125 1125
OLS Regressions; Clustering by treatment groups; only first period observations are used; Significance levels:
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
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B Proposer optimization
We can compute the ex-post profit maximizing offer for each period in a matching group,
given the observed cumulative distribution function of minimum acceptance thresholds Fmt(MAO)
of responders within that matching group:
a∗mt = arg maxa Fmt(a)[k(Y − a)],
where m denotes the individual matching group and t denotes the time period.
prof. max. offer actual avg. offer
PC Matching Group 51.8 56.3
RC Matching Group 45.6 45.8
Mixed Matching Group 39.3 47.5
Table 8: Profit maximizing offers by matching groups
Table 8 shows the average profit maximizing offer in phase 2 of the experiment conditional
on the matching group. Comparing the profit maximizing offers across the different matching
groups, it can be seen that the profit maximizing offer in the PC Matching Group is 6.2 points
higher than in the RC Matching Group (p = 0.25, Ranksum Test based on 10 observations,
one per matching group in each treatment), and 12.5 point higher than in the Mixed Matching
Group (p = 0.08). The profit maximizing offers between the RC matching group and the
mixed matching group are not statistically significantly different (p = 0.35). Pooling the two
matching groups with RC responders and comparing the average profit maximizing offer with
the PC matching group which contained PC responders, the profit maximizing offer in the PC
matching group is 9.5 points higher (p = 0.08, Ranksum test based on 15 observations, one
for each independent matching group). Moreover, actual average offers are not statistically
significantly different from profit maximizing offers in the PC and RC matching groups. The
exception is the mixed matching group, in which actual average offers are significantly larger
than profit maximizing offers (p = 0.08, ranksum test based on matching groups). The
data therefore again supports the predictions of the theory: Proposers’ behavior is close to
profit maximizing. Because minimum acceptance thresholds differ depending on responder
experience, profit maximizing behavior leads proposers to adopt their offers depending on
responder experience.
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C Proofs of Propositions (online publication only)
Proof of Proposition 1. We will establish this result under the following more general as-
sumptions: the two proposers have reference points rP1 , rP2 ∈ [0, 1], and the responder has a
reference point rR ∈ [0, 1] such that rPi + rR ≤ 1.
We begin by showing that both proposers offering a = Y and the responder accepting one
of the offers is, indeed, a SPE. Begin with the responder. His utility from rejecting both offers
is uR = 0. His utility from accepting one of the offers is uR = Y −λmax(rRY −Y, 0) = Y > 0,
since rR ≤ 1. Thus it is optimal for the responder to accept. Next, consider the proposers.
Both proposers get a financial payoff of 0 when they both offer a = Y , regardless of whose
offer the responder accepts. Now if proposer i deviates and offers ai < Y then the responder
will reject his offer with probability 1. This proposer i will then again end up with a financial
payoff of 0. Thus neither proposer has an incentive to deviate.
We now show that there exists no SPE in which both proposers offer ai < Y with positive
probability. For each of the proposers i, let αi denote their (possibly) mixed strategy. Let ai
denote the lowest offer in the support of αi. Let H2 be the cumulative distribution function
corresponding to proposer 2’s offers, and set a′2 = inf{a′ : H2(a′) > 0}. We will begin by
showing that it is impossible to have a1 < a
′
2 < Y in any SPE.
So suppose, by way of contradiction, that a′2 < Y . Since conditional on accepting an
offer, the responder’s utility is strictly increasing in the size of the offer, the responder will
reject the offer a1 with probability 1. Thus when proposer 1 makes an offer a1, his utility
cannot be greater than zero.
Set
a† :=
rRkY
1− rR + krR
and suppose that proposer 2 makes an offer ai ≤ a† with positive probability. Then for
proposer 1, an offer of a1 is strictly dominated by an offer of a = a
† + , for a small enough
 > 0. Notice that if a > a†, then a > rR[k(Y − a) + a] by definition, and thus the responder
derives positive utility from accepting the offer a. Thus proposer 1’s utility from having offer
a = a† +  accepted is
uP1 = k(Y − a)− λmax{rP1 [k(Y − a) + a]− k(Y − a), 0}
≥ k(Y − a†)− k− λrR(1 + k)
> 0 for small enough ,
where in going from the first to the second equation we use the assumption that rP1 ≤ 1−rR
and the fact that a† = rR[k(Y −a†)+a†] by definition. Thus if proposer 2 offers ai ≤ a† with
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positive probability, offering a†+  is strictly better than offering a1 for proposer 1, since the
higher offer has a positive probability of generating positive utility to the proposer.
Next, suppose that proposer 2 offers a2 > a
† with probability 1. Then with probability
1, the responder would derive positive utility from accepting an offer made by proposer 2.
This means that whenever proposer 1 offers a1, his offer is rejected, while Proposer 2’s offer
is accepted with probability 1. Now if a′2 < Y , then proposer 1’s utility when he offers
a = a′2 +  (for a small ) and the offer is accepted is
uP1 = k(Y − a)− λmax{rP1 [k(Y − a) + a]− k(Y − a), 0}
= k(Y − a′2)− λmax{rP1 [k(Y − a′2) + a′2]− k(Y − a′2), 0} − k− λrR(1 + k)
> −λmax{rP1 [k(Y − a′2) + a′2]− k(Y − a′2), 0} for small enough 
Suppose now that k ≥ 1 (as in our experiment). If proposer 1 offers a1, then with probability
1 his utility is at most as good as −λrP1 [k(Y −a′2)+a′2] (for each possible offer that proposer
2 makes), and thus proposer 1 increases his utility with positive probability when he offers
a1 +  for some small  > 0.
When k < 1 and a′2 < Y , then proposer 1’s utility when he offers a1 is at most as good as
−λrP1Y with probability 1 (for each possible offer that proposer 2 makes). However, when
proposer 1 offers a = Y , this offer is accepted whenever proposer 2 offers a2 < Y ; thus for a
positive measure of proposer 2’s offers, proposer 1’s utility increases from at most −λrP1Y
to 0 when he offers a = Y instead of a = a1. We have thus established that when a
′
2 < Y ,
there is no SPE in which proposer 1 offers a < a2.
Suppose now that a1 = a
′
2 < Y . If a
′
2 is offered with probability 0 by proposer 2, then a
verbatim repetition of the previous arguments establishes a contradiction. So suppose that
a′2 is offered with positive probability. In this case, when proposers i = 1, 2 both offer a
′
2,
at least one of these offers must be rejected with positive probability in the SPE. But then,
the proposer whose offer is rejected with positive probability is better off increasing that
offer by some tiny  > 0, thereby increasing his probability of acceptance by a non-trivial
probability, while at the same time decreasing his payoff conditional on acceptance by a
negligible amount.
Thus a1 ≤ a′2 < Y cannot be supported in a SPE, and an identical argument shows that
a2 ≤ a′1 < Y cannot be supported in a SPE either. This establishes that at least one of the
proposers must offer a = Y with probability 1 in any mixed-strategy equilibrium.
When restricting to pure-strategy equilibria, there cannot be an equilibrium in which
proposer 1 offers a1 < Y with probability 1, while proposer 2 offers a2 = Y with probability
1. A profitable deviation for proposer 2 would be to offer a1 +  < Y . And similar logic
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shows that proposer 2 can’t offer a2 < Y .
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove this result under the more general conditions that the
responders have reference points rR1 = rR2 = rR ∈ [0, 1] and the proposer has a reference
point rP ≤ 1− rR.
First, notice that regardless of j’s strategy, responder i is always willing to accept an
offer
a ≥ aˆ := λrRkY
1 + λ(rk − r + 1) .
This is because
aˆ− λ [rR[k(Y − aˆ) + aˆ]− aˆ] = 0 (5)
and so receiving an offer a ≥ aˆ yields weakly positive utility to responder i, regardless of
what responder j does. Thus, since an offer a > aˆ is always accepted, the highest offer that
can be supported in a SPE is aˆ.
We now show that any offer a ≤ aˆ can be supported in a SPE. The candidate equilibrium
is one in which 1. the proposer offers a and both responders choose to accept it with
probability 1, 2. the responders both reject any offer a′ < a and 3. the responders both
accept any offer a′ > a. If responder i deviates from equilibrium and rejects, then his utility
is
udeviateR = −λ[rR(k(Y − a) + a)]
with probability 1. In contrast, responder i’s equilibrium payoff is
uequilibR =
1
2
[a− λ[rR(k(Y − a) + a)− a]] + 1
2
[−λ[rR(k(Y − a) + a)]] = udeviateR +
1
2
(1 + λ)a.
Thus for a > 0, the responder is strictly better off accepting, while for a = 0 the responder
is weakly better off accepting.
Now clearly, the proposer has no incentive to offer a′ > a. Next, we show that the
subgame following an offer of a′ < a has an equilibrium in which both responders reject. To
see this, consider the payoff responder i gets when he deviates. By equation (5), accepting an
offer a′ < a ≤ aˆ generates negative utility for responder i. On the other hand, if responder
sticks with his equilibrium strategy and rejects, then all three players get financial payoffs
equal to zero, and thus responder i’s utility is non-negative. Thus responder i is better off
sticking with his equilibrium strategy.
The exact statement of Proposition 2 obtains in the special case that rR = 1/3.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of this proposition considers the more general case in
which players don’t necessarily coordinate on the zero offers equilibrium in the RC market.
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By Proposition 1, µ1R = 1 for a responder from the PC market. By Proposition 2, a
responder in the RC market is offered a ≤ aˆ := λkY
3+(2+k)λ
. This means that the responder’s
share of the surplus is at most
µ¯RC :=
aˆ
(Y − aˆ)k + aˆ .
And computations reveal that µ¯RC < 1/3. Note, however, that it is possible that µ
1
R = 0 <
µ¯RC in case the offer actually went to the other responder in the RC market.
Either way, we have that the responders’ period 2 reference points, as a function of γ are
rRPC =
1 + γ
2
rRRC =
1− γ
2
+ γµ1RRC .
And since 1/2 > µ1RRC , it easily follows that rPC is increasing in γ while rPC is decreasing
in γ.
The statement of the proposition will thus be proven by showing that the minimal ac-
ceptable offer is a strictly increasing function of the reference point.
To see this, notice that the lowest offer a responder is willing to accept must satisfy
M − λ[r[(Y −M)k +M ]−M ] = 0
from which it follows that M = rkY
1−r+kr , which is an increasing function of r for any k > 0.
We now formulate a more general version of proposition 4 that does not rely on the
assumption that the RC market is characterized by a zero offers equilibrium. In particular, we
suppose that in the RC market, responders are offered some a ≤ aˆ and that both responders
accept the offer in equilibrium. This means that half of the responders receive a share
µ1
RLRC
= 0 of the surplus, since they do not get to receive the offer, while the other half of
the responders receive a share µ1
RHRC
≥ 0 of the surplus, since they do get to participate in
the offer. We assume that in the ultimatum game, the proposer does not know which of the
responders he is facing. That is, the proposer believes that with probability 1/2 he is facing
a responder with µ1
RLRC
= 0, and with probability 1/2 he is facing a responder with µ1
RHRC
≥ 0.
We let MRC,L and MRC,H denote the corresponding MAOs. We now formulate the following
more general proposition to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game:
Proposition 7. 1. A PC proposer offers MPC to a PC responder in any PBE
2. A PC proposer offers MRC,H to a RC responder if k(Y −MRC,H) > 2k(Y −MRC,L)
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and offers MRC,L otherwise
3. A RC proposer offers MRC,H to a RC responder if k(Y −MRC,H) > 2k(Y −MRC,L)
and offers MRC,L otherwise
4. There exists a γ† ∈ (0, 1] such that
(a) If γ ≤ γ† then a RC proposer always offers MPC to a PC responder
(b) If γ ∈ (γ†, 1) then a RC proposer offers a < MPC to a PC responder
Proof of Proposition 7. Proof of (1). Let rPPC and rRPC be the period 2 reference points of
the proposer and responder who participated in the PC market in phase 1. By Proposition
1, proposers get a zero share of the surplus in the PC market while responders get a full
share of the surplus in the PC market. Thus
rPPC + rRPC =
(
1− γ
2
+ γ · 0
)
+
(
1− γ
2
+ γ · 1
)
= 1. (6)
Now conditional on making an offer that the responder will accept in phase 2, the proposer’s
optimal strategy is to offer a = MPC . The only thing we have to check is that the proposer’s
utility from having this offer implemented is non-negative. The proposer’s utility from having
this offer implemented is:
uP = k(Y −MPC)− λmax{rPPC [k(Y −MPC) +MPC ]− k(Y −MPC), 0}, (7)
Equation (7) is certainly non-negative if rPPCW − k(Y − MPC) ≤ 0, where W = k(Y −
MPC) +MPC . But by definition, MPC must satisfy
MPC − λmax{rRPCW −MPC , 0} = 0 (8)
from it which it follows that rRPCW −MPC > 0. Thus
rPPCW = (1− rRPC )W < W −MPC = k(Y −MPC), (9)
from which it follows that equation (7) is positive.
Proof of (2). Let rRRC denote the phase 2 reference point of an RC responder. Then
because rRRC ≤ rRPC , equation (6) implies that rPPC + rRRC ≤ 1. Analogous to equation (8)
we can establish that MRC,H −λmax{rRRC,HW −MRC,H , 0} = 0, where W is now defined as
W = k(Y −MRC,H) +MRC,H . Thus analogous to (9), we find that rPPCW < k(Y −MRC,H).
This means that in the domain of offers a ≤ MRC,H , the proposer’s share of the surplus
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exceeds his fairness reference point, and thus he acts as a purely profit-maximizing agent
in that domain of offers. Statement (2) now follows because the proposer’s maximization
problem now simply boils down figuring out if he is better off offering MRC,H and having
his offer accepted by all responders or if he is better off offering MRC,L and having his offer
accepted by just half of the responders.
Proof of (3). This proof is virtually identical to the proof of (2).
Proof of (4). As before, it is clear that conditional on making an offer that the responder
will accept in phase 2, the proposer’s optimal strategy is to offer a = MPC . However, when
there is no offer that is acceptable to the responder and that will generate non-negative
utility to the proposer, the proposer’s optimal strategy is to offer a < MPC . As before, the
proposer’s utility, as a function of γ, is
uP (γ) = k(Y −MPC(γ))− λmax{rPRC (γ)[k(Y −MPC(γ)) +MPC(γ)]− k(Y −MPC(γ)), 0}.
(10)
But
rPRC [k(Y −MPC) +MPC ]− k(Y −MPC) = MPC [k(1− rPRC ) + rPRC ] + kY (rPRC − 1). (11)
Now the left-hand side of (11) is clearly increasing in rPRC , while the right-hand side of
(11) is clearly increasing in MPC . Thus (11) is increasing in γ because MPC and rPRC are
increasing in γ. From this, it follows that uP (γ) is decreasing in γ.
Next, we have
rPRC + rRPC =
(
1− γ
2
+ γ · µP,PC
)
+
(
1− γ
2
+ γ · 1
)
= 1 + γµP,RC , (12)
where µP,RC > 0 is the share of the surplus that the proposer gets in the RC market. As
before, we have that rRPCW > MPC , where W = k(Y −MPC) +MPC . Thus
rPRCW = (1− rRPC + γµP,RC)W < W −MPC + γµP,RCW = k(Y −MPC) + γµP,RC .
Thus when γ = 0, we have that k(Y −MPC)− rPRCW > 0. Moreover, since k(Y −MPC)−
rPRCW is continuous in γ, we know that k(Y −MPC) − rPRCW > 0 for a neighborhood of
γ around 0, and thus that uP (γ) > 0 for γ close enough to zero. Moreover, since uP (γ) is
continuous and decreasing in γ, there must exist some γ† ∈ (0, 1] such that uP (γ) is positive
if and only if γ ≤ γ†.
To see that γ† can sometimes be less than 1 in the above proof, fix γ and let λ be very
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large, so that both the proposer and responder require approximately a share rPRC and rRPC ,
respectively, of the surplus to derive non-negative utility from the transaction. But since
rPRC + rRPC > 1, there will not be a division of surplus that suits both the proposer and
responder.
Proof of Proposition 5. We prove that the statement of the proposition holds under more
general assumptions about how reference points are formed. In particular, let w0, w1, . . . ...
be an infinite sequence given by w0 = 1 and wj = δ
j for some δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then let the period
t reference point of player i be given by
rti = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ
∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
i∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
.
The definition used in the main body of the paper is obtained as a special case in which
δ = 1.
Step 1: We first show that there is a unique steady state. In any steady state, we must
have
M∗ − λ[r∗R(k(Y −M∗) +M∗)−M∗] = 0, (13)
which can be rearranged to show that
M∗
k(Y −M∗) +M∗ =
λr∗R
1 + λ
. (14)
As in the proof of Proposition 7, offering a∗ = M∗ is clearly optimal for the proposer,
conditional on making an offer that the responder will accept. Moreover, since r∗P + r
∗
R = 1
by definition, we can show, analogously to equation (9), that
r∗P [k(Y −M∗) +M∗] < k(Y −M∗),
from which it follows that the proposer derives positive utility from making an offer a∗ = M∗.
Thus the proposer’s optimal strategy is to offer a∗ = M∗ in any steady state.
Plugging in a∗ = M∗ into (14), and using the definition of r∗R, we now have that
r∗R = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ
λ
1 + λ
r∗R. (15)
Equation (15) is a linear equation in r∗R with a unique solution given by
r∗R =
(1− γ) + λ(1− γ)
2 + 2λ(1− γ) . (16)
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Thus there can be at most one steady state. We now show that the unique solution does,
indeed, correspond to a steady state. First, examination of equation (16) shows that r∗R ∈
(0, 1): since (1−γ) < 2, it is clear that the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Next,
by definition of M∗, accepting an offer of a∗ = M∗ is weakly optimal for the responder. And
as we have already established, offering a∗ = M∗ is also optimal for the proposer.
Step 2: We now show that for each  > 0, there exists a t ≥ 1 such that rtR + rtP ≤ 1 + .
To see this, notice that µtR + µ
t
P ≤ 1 for t ≥ 1, regardless of the outcome in period t. Thus
rtR + r
t
P = (1− γ) + γ
(∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
≤ (1− γ) + γ
(∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
+
∑t−1
τ=1wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
= 1 + γ
(∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
−
∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
But ∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
≤
∑0
τ=−T 2wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
and ∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ 0
as t→∞. Thus for each  > 0, there exists a t ≥ 1 such that rtR + rtP ≤ 1 + .
Step 3: We now show that there is some t† ≥ 1 such that at = M t for all t ≥ t†; that
is, for all t ≥ t†, the proposer derives positive utility from offering M t and having that offer
accepted.
Set rtP = 1−rtR+t. As in the proof of Proposition 7, we have that rtR[k(Y −M t)+M t] >
M t. Thus
rtP [k(Y −M t) +M t] = (1− rtR + t)[k(Y −M t) +M t]
< [k(Y −M t) +M t]−M t + t[k(Y −M t) +M t]
= k(Y −M t) + t[k(Y −M t) +M t].
This means that the proposer’s utility from offering M t is such that
utP ≥ k(Y −M t)− λmax(t, 0).
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Moreover, because rtR ≤ (1− γ)/2 + γ = (1 + γ)/2, it easily follows that
M t =
kλrtRY
1 + λ(1− rtR) + kλrtR
is bounded away from Y (for all possible λ) as long as γ < 1. Thus we have that for all t,
there is some c > 0 such that k(Y −M t) ≥ c. By step 2, there is a t† such that λt < c for
all t ≥ t†. Thus there is a t† such that k(Y −M t)− λmax(t, 0) > 0 for all t ≥ t†.
Step 4: We now strengthen step 2 to show that |rtP + rtR − 1| → 0. By step 3, we now
have that µtR + µ
t
P = 1 for all t ≥ t†. Thus for t > t†,
rtR + r
t
P = (1− γ) + γ
(∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
= (1− γ) + γ
(∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
+
∑t−1
τ=t† wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
= 1 + γ
(∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
−
∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
But since ∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ 0
and ∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ 0
as t→∞, it follows that rtR + rtP → 1 as t→∞.
Step 5: We now finish off the proof of the proposition by proving that the steady state
identified in Step 1 is globally stable.
Define νtR =
∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
i∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
. Define the map ξ : R→ R as follows:
ξ(ν) = (1− γ)/2 + γν.
Define the map ψ : R→ R as follows:
ψ(ν) =
λξ(ν)
1 + λ
.
Notice that ψ is linear in ν and has slope γλ/(1 + λ) < 1; thus ψ is a contraction and has a
42
unique fixed point. In a steady state, r∗R = ξ(ν
∗
R), and thus equation (14) implies that
M∗
k(Y −M∗) +M∗ = ψ(ν
∗
R). (17)
But since ν∗R =
M∗
k(Y−M∗)+M∗ by definition, it follows that the unique fixed point of ψ corre-
sponds to the unique steady state.
Now for t† defined as in step 3, rt = ξ(νt) and M
t
k(Y−Mt)+Mt = ψ(ν
t
R) for all t ≥ t†. Because
ξ is strictly increasing, each value of νtR corresponds to a unique value of M
t. Because ψ
is strictly increasing and because M
t
k(Y−Mt)+Mt is strictly increasing in r
t
R, each value of ν
t
R
also corresponds to a unique value of M t. Because ξ and ψ are both continuous functions
of ν, showing that νtR → ν∗R will thus imply that M t → M∗ and rtR → r∗R. Moreover, since
|rtR+rtP −1| → 0 by Step 4, convergence of rtR will also imply convergence of rtP . And finally,
since Step 3 shows that at = M t for all t ≥ t†, νtR → ν∗R will thus also imply that at → a∗.
Because ψ is an increasing and linear function of νt that crosses the 45-degree line exactly
once, it thus follows that ψ(ν) ∈ (ν∗, ν) for ν > ν∗ and ψ(ν) ∈ (ν, ν∗) for ν < ν∗. By
definition,
νt+1R =
w0∑t
τ=−T wt−τ
µtR +
(
1− w0∑t
τ=−T wt−τ
)
νtR (18)
is a convex combination of νtR and ψ(ν
t
R) =
Mt
k(Y−Mt)+Mt = µ
t
R, which implies that ν
t+1
R ∈
(ν∗R, ν
t
R) if ν
t
R > ν
∗
R. Similarly, it follows that ν
t+1
R ∈ (νtR, ν∗R) if νtR < ν∗R.
For t† defined as in step 3, a simple induction thus implies that if νt
†
R < ν
∗
R, then ν
t
R will
be strictly increasing for t ≥ t† and bounded from above by ν∗. Similarly, if νt†R > ν∗, then νtR
will be strictly decreasing for t ≥ t† and bounded from below by ν∗R. Because any monotonic
and bounded sequence converges, νtR must converge to some ν
∗∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Because each value
of νtR corresponds to a unique value of M
t, and because ψ is continuous in ν, there must,
therefore, exist some M∗∗ such that M t →M∗∗. Thus
lim
t→∞
µtR = lim
t→∞
M t
k(Y −M t) +M t =
M∗∗
k(Y −M∗∗) +M∗∗ .
It is then easy to show that
νt =
∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
i∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ M
∗∗
k(Y −M∗∗) +M∗∗ .
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On the other hand,
ψ(νtR) =
M t
k(Y −M t) +M t →
M∗∗
k(Y −M∗∗) +M∗∗ .
But since ψ is continuous, we therefore have that ψ(ν∗∗) = ν∗∗. And because ψ has a unique
fixed point, it must be that ν∗∗ = ν∗R, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since rtP + r
t
R ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 1, the reasoning of Step 3 in the proof
of Proposition 5 implies that the proposer will offer at = M t in all periods t ≥ 1. Thus for
t ≥ 1, rt = ξ(νtR) and M
t
k(Y−Mt)+Mt = ψ(ν
t
R).
As in the proof of Proposition 5, a simple induction thus implies that if ν1R < ν
∗
R, then
νtR will be strictly increasing for t ≥ 1 and bounded from above by ν∗. Similarly, if ν1 > ν∗R,
then νtR will be strictly decreasing for t ≥ 1 and bounded from below by ν∗R. But since M t
is a monotonic function ζ(·) of νtR such that M∗ = ζ(ν∗R), the result follows.
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